We analyze producer price developments in the transition from a national exchange rate regime to a monetary union. The focus is on the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Stylized facts witness about an exploding gaps in producer-price inflation during the years immediately following the...

Anticompetitive mergers increase competitors' profits, since they reduce competition. Using a model of endogenous mergers, we show that such mergers nevertheless may reduce the competitors' share-prices. Thus, event-studies can not detect anti-competitive mergers. 

Markets with imperfect competition do not induce a cost-minimizing allocation of production between firms. The market's ability to rationalize production is even more limited if costs are private information to firms. Merger in such markets generate an efficiency gain associated with the pooling...

This study examines the relation between the internationalization of firms and CEO compensation. Starting from a sample of Norwegian and Swedish listed firms we analyze the effects of internationalization as manifest in the capital market (international cross-listing), the market for corporate...

This paper analyzes corporate restructuring and its role in generating labor productivity growth in a sample of large Swedish manufacturing corporations. It is found that external restructuring, including ownership changes, start-ups and closures of plants, accounted for up to 47 percent of the...

This paper tests the insiders' dilemma hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. The insiders' dilemma means that a profitable merger does not occur, because it is even more profitable for each firm to unilaterally stand as an outsider (Kamien and Zang, 1990 and 1993). The experimental data...

There is diverging empirical evidence on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers: consumer prices (and thus presumably competitors' profits) often rise while competitors' share prices fall. Our model of endogenous mergers provides a possible reconciliation. It is demonstrated that...

Based on a two-million-observation panel dataset that matches public firms with detailed data on their employees, we find that entrenched managers pay their workers more. For example, our estimates show that CEOs with more control rights (votes) than all other blockholders together, pay their...

This paper proposes an approach for prediction the pattern of mergers when different mergers are feasible. It generalizes the traditional IO approach, employing ideas on coalition-formation from cooperative gave theory. The model suggests that in concentrated markets, mergers are conductive to...

Markets with imperfect competition do not induce a cost-minimizing allocation of production between firms. The market's ability to rationalize production is even more limited if costs are private information to firms. Merger in such markets generate an efficiency gain associated with the pooling...