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Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities

van Damme, Eric; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1999

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082492

Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation

Björnerstedt, Jonas; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1994

No abstract.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010611601

What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?

Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1997

Evolutionary theorizing has a long tradition in economics. Only recently has this approach been brought into the framework of non-cooperative game theory. Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategic behaviour with respect to evolutionary forces in the context of games played...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771089

Social Networks

de Marti, Joan; Zenou, Yves - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2009

We survey the literature on social networks by putting together the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their similarities and differences. We expose, in particular, the two main ways of modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502564

Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model

Weibull, Jörgen W.; Saez-Marti, Maria - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1998

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190635

Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games

Benaim, Michel; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2000

This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when finite populations recurrently play finite games. The deterministic approximation is defined in continuous time as a system of ordinary differential equations of the type studied in evolutionary game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419542

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games.

Banerjee, A.; Weibull, J.W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1996

This paper examines equilibrioum and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2x2 coordination games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639287

Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model.

Saez-Marti, M.; Weibull, J.W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1998

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational indivudals are recurrently matched to play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply tthe myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639310

Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games.

Benaim, M.; Weibull, J.W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2000

This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when finite populations of boundedly rational agents recurrently play finite games. The deterministic approximation is defined in continuous time in terms of a system of ordinary differential equations of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639325

Uniqueness in Infinitely Repeated Decision Problems

Vieille, Nicolas; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2002

Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the … decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame … decision problems with discounting. The condition is two-fold: the range of possible utility levels in the decision problem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645366