This paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where one lower level government is first mover also in the horizontal dimension. Under plausible assumptions, horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized...

This paper concerns income taxation, commodity taxation, production taxation and public good provision in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each jurisdiction is large in the sense that its government is able to influence the world-market...

This paper concerns income and commodity taxation in a multi-jurisdictional <p> framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each jurisdiction <p> is large in the sense that its government is able to influence the world <p> market prices via public policy. In such a framework, a...</p></p></p>

This paper analyzes environmental policy in a decentralized economic federation comprising two countries, where a federal government decides upon environmental targets (maximum allowable emissions) for each country, which are implemented by the national governments. Both national governments...

This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four papers, which relate to environmental policy in the presence of transboundary environmental damage. Paper [I] concerns public policy in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. Each jurisdiction is assumed...

This paper characterizes income and commodity taxation as the outcome of a noncooperative Nash game in a two-country economy where one of the countries produces an environmentally clean good, while the other produces a dirty good. Among the results, it is shown that the commodity tax on the...