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Asymmetric Auction Experiments With(out) Commonly Known Beliefs

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867012

Collusion mechanisms in procurement auctions:An experimental investigation

Brosig, Jeannette; Güth, Werner; Weiland, Torsten - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

’ costs are easily estimated. If, however, the individualcosts of bidders are private information, effective ring formation is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866708

Do prices in the unmediated call auction reflect insiderinformation? – An experimental analysis

Brünner, Tobias; Levinski, Rene - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

information of a single informed insider,however, is less well understood. We analyse this question by presenting a simplecall … auction game where both auction prices and limit prices of uninformed tradersre°ect potential insider information. The … trading volume, uninformed traders fail to incorporate the (potential)insider information in their limit prices. We also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866435

Bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions : an experimental investigation and some theoretical insights

Engelmann, Dirk (contributor); Grimm, Veronika (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource], 1. ed.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002201189

Asset markets and equilibrium selection in public goods games with provision points: an experimental study

Broseta, Bruno (contributor); Fatás, Enrique (contributor); … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource], 1. ed

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001625855