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of the standard model which do not respond to changes in supply or demand. Despite incomplete information, equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750729
We consider an extension of the standard Rubinstein model where both players are randomly allowed to leave the negotiation after a rejection, in which case they obtain a payoff known value. We show that, when the value of the outside opportunities is of intermediate size, there exist a continuum...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369115
This paper explores the role of conflict as a bargaining tool. It first presents a simple bargaining model with one …-sided incomplete information. Parties can choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in: A limited conflict that … information about the eventual outcome of the absolute one. In this framework, it is shown that confrontation has a double …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086773
We propose a new bargaining solution, based on the idea - borrowed from Hobbes - that the agreement reached in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750726
This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of … bargaining to resume. In the presence of private information, these limited conflicts convey information and thus become a … sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465156
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002201189
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001625855