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Enjoy the Silence: An Experiment on Truth-Telling

Sanchez-Pages, Santiago; Vorsatz, Marc - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2007

We analyze experimentally two sender-receiver games with conflictive preferences. In the first game, the sender can choose to tell the truth, to lie, or to remain silent. The latter strategy is costly and similar to an outside option. If sent, the receiver can either trust or distrust the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086757

An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game

Sanchez-Pages, Santiago; Vorsatz, Marc - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2004

A recent experimental study of Cai and Wang (2003) on strategic information transmission games reveals that subjects … tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis. To evidence that this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147090

Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence

Hopkins, Ed - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2005

of the standard model which do not respond to changes in supply or demand. Despite incomplete information, equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750729

Bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions : an experimental investigation and some theoretical insights

Engelmann, Dirk (contributor); Grimm, Veronika (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource], 1. ed.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002201189

Asset markets and equilibrium selection in public goods games with provision points: an experimental study

Broseta, Bruno (contributor); Fatás, Enrique (contributor); … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource], 1. ed

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001625855