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Bester, Helmut; Sakovics, Jozsef - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2004

We examine the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when the delegation contract is renegotiable. We consider a … seller who can either bargain face-to-face with a prospective buyer or delegate bargaining to an intermediary. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147112

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

School of Economics, University of Edinburgh; Jeroen … - 2013

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information …. Sellers have private information about the buyer’s valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We … there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people’s ability to spot deception. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931973

A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms

Corazzini, Lucca; Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Lucca - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2007

provision of public goods, under the assumptions of income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750756

Who is the fairest of them all? The independent effect of attractive features and self-perceived attractiveness on cooperation among women.

School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2013

We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap-talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931971

Methods of Comparison in Games of Status

Hopkins, Ed; Kornienko, Tatiana - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2005

This paper considers the effects of changes in the income distribution in an economy where agents’ utility depends both on consumption and on their rank in the distribution of consumption of a positional good. We introduce a new methodology to compare the behavior of agents that occupy the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369061

Rank-Based Methods for the Analysis of Auctions

Hopkins, Ed - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2007

. We also look at auctions where one bidder has more precise information than the other. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369064

The Stability of Price Dispersion under Seller and Consumer Learning (first version)

Hopkins, Ed; Seymour, Robert M - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2004

In many markets it is possible to find rival sellers charging different prices for the same good. Earlier research has attempted to explain this phenomenon by demonstrating the existence of dispersed price equilibria when consumers must make use of costly search to discover prices. We ask...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369072

Consumption, Status and Redistribution

Hopkins, Ed; Kornienko, Tatiana - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2004

This paper considers the effect of inequality when there are concerns for status. We analyse the effects of linear redistributive taxes in an economy where agents’ utility depends both on consumption and on their rank in the distribution of consumption of a positional good. This increase in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369083

Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria

Hopkins, Ed; Hofbauer, Josef; Benaim, Michel - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2005

We investigate games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning processes. We show that when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and so place greater weight on more recent experience that the time average of play often converges in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005369088

On the Co-Existence of Conventions

Anwar, Ahmed - School of Economics, University of Edinburgh - 2004

Recent stochastic evolutionary models have shown that the most likely convention when the probability of a mutation is sufficiently small is coordination on the risk-dominant strategy rather than the payoff-dominant one. This paper looks at the consequences of player movement between locations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005086756