We analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolistto a continuum of heterogeneous downstream firms. The novelty of ourapproach is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly, whichintroduces an interesting trade-off. As a consequence, partial pricediscrimination arises...

Using only information on the degree of concavity of demand and observable structural variables as the market share of firms, a necessary and sufficient condition for a merger to increase welfare is derived. On the profitability side, we obtain that when market size decreases merger...

The US Merger Guidelines consider that the anticompetitive effect of a horizontal merger is increasing in the initial market concentration and decreasing in the elasticity of demand. These ideas are studied in a setting where identical firms compete à la Cournot and marginal cost is constant....

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing an innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if and only if i) the goods are close enough substitutes, ii) the...

We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform...

An independent research laboratory owns a patented process innovation that can be licensed by means of an auction to two Cournot duopolists producing differentiated goods. For large innovations and close enough substitute goods the patentee auctions o¤ only one license, preventing the full...

We study the incentives to create divisions by a firm once it is taken into account the vertical structures of an industry. Downstream firms, that must buy an essential input to upstream firms, may create divisions. Divisionalization reduces their bargaining power against upstream firms. This...

We consider an upstream firm selling an input to several downstream firms through observable two-part tariff contracts. Downstream firms can alternatively buy the input from a less efficient source of supply. We show that downstream mergers lead to lower wholesale prices. They translate into...

This paper analyzes the effects of ATM surcharges on deployment and welfare, in a model where banks compete for ATM and banking services. Foreign fees, surcharges and the interchange fee are endogenously determined. We find that, when the interchange fee is cooperatively fixed by banks to...

The result of neutrality of vertical integration for competition postulated by the Chicago School can be supported by a benchmark model with (1) an upstream monopolist, (2) homogeneous goods downstream and (3) observable (two-part tariff) contracts. The result does not hold however, whenever any...