Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731204
Let µ be a rational distribution over a finite alphabet, and ( ) be a n-periodic sequences which first n elements are drawn i.i.d. according to µ. We consider automata of bounded size that input and output at stage t. We prove the existence of a constant C such that, whenever , with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731250
This paper analyzes the possibility of irnplementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisins and the hypotesis of agents' behaviour consiclered in the Nash equilibriurn concept . We analyze the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731341
This paper presents a model of network formation with costly links. We endogenize the amount of cost born by each player involved in a bilateral link by considering that these shares result from bargaining. We analyze this feature in a context of coordination games. We show that, if the cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731364
In this paper we study a situation were the planner cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome function is substituted by the planner herself. We assume 1) agents have complete information and play simultaneously; and 2) given the messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731405
In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515885
This paper presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a coordination game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515886
This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudent´ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515906
In this paper we explore the notion that players are decent, in the sensethat their choices are bound by certain unwritten social rules. We apply thisidea to two cases: bankruptcy and bargaining in exchange economies. Wecharacterize the results that are generated by such a behavior in the cases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515932