Let µ be a rational distribution over a finite alphabet, and ( ) be a n-periodic sequences which first n elements are drawn i.i.d. according to µ. We consider automata of bounded size that input and output at stage t. We prove the existence of a constant C such that, whenever , with...

This paper examines the stability of deterministic steady-states in a class of economies where the state -variable is one dimensional and where agents use Bayesian techniques to form expectations. Thr dynamics with learning are locally convergent if the prior mean is close to a stable perfect...

This paper analyzes the possibility of irnplementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisins and the hypotesis of agents' behaviour consiclered in the Nash equilibriurn concept . We analyze the possibility of...

This paper presents a model of network formation with costly links. We endogenize the amount of cost born by each player involved in a bilateral link by considering that these shares result from bargaining. We analyze this feature in a context of coordination games. We show that, if the cost of...

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals' preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.

In this paper we present a general result on the convergence to an equilibrium of a class of dynamic adjustment procedures -which includes Gradient Systems and Best Reply Dynamics as special cases- when there are two players and strategy sets are one dimensional. We also show that there are no...

This paper presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a coordination game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not...

This paper introduces a property over agents' preferences, called Tops Responsiveness Condition. Such a property guarantees that the core in Hedonic Coalition Formation games is not empty. It is also shown that a mechanism exists that selects a stable allocation. It turns out that this...

This paper considers Nash equilibria of a game played by two populations. Stability of the mixed equilibria is diacU8aed for a wide class of differential systems describing the evolutionary dynamics of behavior. The main property of the Systems under consideration is that every Nash equilibrium...