I construct a model in which an oligopoly first invests in persuasive advertising in order to induce brand loyalty to consumers who would otherwise buy the cheapest alternative on the market, and then competes in prices. Despite ex-ante symmetry, at equilibrium, there is one firm which chooses a...

This article considers a two-sided private information model. We assume that two exogenouslygiven qualities are offered in a monopolistic market. Prices are fixed. A low quality seller choosesto be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higherprice). We...

This article considers a two-sided private information model. We assume that two exogenously given qualities are offered in a monopolistic market. Prices are ¿xed. A low quality seller chooses to be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higher price)....

I show the uniqueness of equilibrium for a class of oligopoly models with strategic complements.Product differentiation models are considered in which the contraction mapping theorem cannotnecessarily be applied.