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Pérez, José Alcalde; Corchón, Luis; Jiménez, … - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1996

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008542862

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WALRASIAN CORRESPONDENCE BY MARKET GAMES

Corchón, Luis; Wilkie, Simon - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1995

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515885

- SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM

Alcalde, José; Medina, Antonio Romero - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1999

This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudent´ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515906

A DECENT PROPOSAL

Corchón, Luis; Blanco, Carmen Herrero - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1995

In this paper we explore the notion that players are decent, in the sensethat their choices are bound by certain unwritten social rules. We apply thisidea to two cases: bankruptcy and bargaining in exchange economies. Wecharacterize the results that are generated by such a behavior in the cases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515932

Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations

Pérez, José Alcalde; Romero-Medina, Antonio; … - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1997

We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simplesequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then ,each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents'preferences are additive,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212575

SOLOMON'S DILEMMA: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON DYNAMIC IMPLEMENTATION

López-Pintado, Dunia; Ponti, Giovanni - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2003

This paper reports an experimental investigation on two mechanisms for the so-called King Solomon Dilemma, where one of them fails to implement the social choice rule dynamically. We compare the two mechanisms in terms of their welfare, incentive and learning properties.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212602

- EXISTENCE AND NASH IMPLEMENTATION OF EFFICIENT SHARING RULES FOR A COMMONLY OWNED TECHNOLOGY.

Corchón, Luis; Puy, M. Socorro - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2000

Suppose that a group of individuals owns collectively a technology which produces a consumptiongood by means of a (possibly heterogeneous) input. A sharing rule associates input contributionswith a vector of consumptions that are technologically feasible. We show that the set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731204

Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems

Alcalde, José - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1995

This paper analyzes the possibility of irnplementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisins and the hypotesis of agents' behaviour consiclered in the Nash equilibriurn concept . We analyze the possibility of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731341

THE THEORY OF IMPLEMENTATION WHEN THE PLANNER IS A PLAYER

Corchón, Luis; Baliga, Sandeep; Sjöström, Tomas - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1995

messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation … problem into a signaling game. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different … restrictions on the planner's out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We compare our results to standard results on Nash implementation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731405