This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals' preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.

This paper reports an experimental investigation on two mechanisms for the so-called King Solomon Dilemma, where one of them fails to implement the social choice rule dynamically. We compare the two mechanisms in terms of their welfare, incentive and learning properties.

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme position s of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise...

In this work we deal with rationing problems. In particular with claims problems with indivisible goods, that is, problems in which a certain amount of indivisible units (of an homogeneous good), has to be distributed among a group of agents, when this amount is not enough to satisfy agents'...

We consider the problem of allocating a finite set of indivisible goods and a single infinitely divisible good among a group of agents, and we study a solution, called the Equal Split Guarantee solution, in the presence of consistency and population monotonicity properties. This solution is not...

This paper studies economies where agents exchange indivisible goods and money. Agents havepotencial use for all indivisible goods and the indivisible goods are differentiated. We assume thatagents have quasilinear utilities in money, have sufficiently money endowments to afford anygroup of...

In this paper we study the problem of fair allocation in economies with indivisible goods, dropping the usual restriction that one agent receives at most one indivisible good. We show that most of the results obtained in the literature do not hold when the above mentioned restriction is dropped.

In a distribution problem, and specifically in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and theEgalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. TheConstrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is introduced in bankruptcy literature to ensure that noagent receives more...

Thinking of electoral rules, common wisdom suggests that proportional rule is more fair, since all voters are equally represented: at times, it turns out that this is false. I study the formation of both Parliament and Government; for the composition of the former I consider plurality and...

As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity on the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called µ-Additivity. We find that µ-Additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, Anonymity and Continuity,...