The literature on vouchers often concludes that a voucher-based system cannot be the outcome of a majority vote. This paper shows that it is possible to propose selective vouchers (of exogenous value) such that the majority of voters are in favour of selective vouchers. As long as the...

This paper studies convergence and stability properties of Sjöström's (1994) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic learning dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions in...

Choice functions on tournaments always select the maximal element (Condorcet winner), provided they exist, but this property does not hold in the more general case of weak tournaments. In this paper we analyze the relationship between the usual choice functions and the set of maximal elements in...

This paper presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a coordination game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not...

In this paper we have introduced and parameterized the concept of ?group cohesion? in a model of local interaction with a population divided into groups. This allows us to control the level of ?isolation? of these groups: We thus analyze if the degree of group cohesion is relevant to achieve an...

We analyze a multi-issue bargaining model where the joint production of public goods is budget-constrained. The players must decide the part of the budget that is dedicated to produce any public good. We model the decision process as an alternating offer bargaining game with random proposers....

Alternating bargaining has been extensively used to model two-sidednegotiations. The celebrated model of Rubinstein (1982) has provided a formaljustification for equitable payoff division. A typical assumption of these models underrisk is that the breakdown event means a complete and irrevocable...

The matching of individuals in teams is a key element in the functioning of an economy. The network of social ties can potentially transmit important information on abilities and reputations and also help mitigate matching frictions by facilitating interactions among ¿screened¿ individuals. We...

The form of the Engel curve has long been a subject of discussion in appliedeconometrics and until now there has no been definitive conclusion about its form. In this paperan additive partially linear model is used to estimate semiparametrically the effect of totalexpenditure in the context of...

This paper presents a model of network formation with costly links. We endogenize the amount of cost born by each player involved in a bilateral link by considering that these shares result from bargaining. We analyze this feature in a context of coordination games. We show that, if the cost of...