We construct a general-equilibrium version of Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rulland Violante’s (2000) model with capital-skill complementarity. To account forgrowth patterns observed in the data, we assume several sources of growthsimultaneously, specifically, exogenous growth of skilled and...

In this paper the long-run effects of demand and recharge uncertainty on the socially optimal management of groundwater reserves are studied. Demand uncertainty is modeled in a dynamic framework by letting the demand function shift randomly but continuously through time according to a random...

This paper develops a two-sector model for a renewable natural resource based economy. Pareto efficient results show the optimal harvesting rate that allows for sustained long-run optimal growth, which is upper-bounded by the biological rate of reproduction. Regulation prevents from resource...

This paper studies the properties of solutions to a log-linearized version of the neoclassical growth model with quasi-geometric discounting. We show that after the log-linearization, the model has indeterminacy and multiplicity of equilibria even though the original non-linear model has a...

The neoclassical growth model with quasi-geometric discounting is shown by Krusell and Smith (2000) to have multiple solutions. As a result, value-iterative methods fail to converge. The set of equilibria is however reduced if we restrict our attention to the interior (satisfying the Euler...

We experimentally study the e¤ect of time on altruism. By postponing payments in a standard Dictator game, subjects allocate a future payment between themselves and others. Since both the payoffs of the Dictator and the Receiver are delayed until the same time, standard intertemporal utility...

This paper studies a complete-market version of the neoclassical growth model, where agents face idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. We show that if agents possess identical preferences of either the CRRA or the addilog type, then the heterogeneous-agent economy behaves as if there was a...

We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers'...

We experimentally investigate the effect of population viscosity (an increased probability to interact with others of one's type or group) on cooperation in a standard prisoner's dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups that differ in the defector gain in the...

This paper reports an experimental investigation on two mechanisms for the so-called King Solomon Dilemma, where one of them fails to implement the social choice rule dynamically. We compare the two mechanisms in terms of their welfare, incentive and learning properties.