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Chioveanu, Ioana - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2005

I construct a model in which an oligopoly first invests in persuasive advertising in order to induce brand loyalty to consumers who would otherwise buy the cheapest alternative on the market, and then competes in prices. Despite ex-ante symmetry, at equilibrium, there is one firm which chooses a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731293

Spatial density, average prices and price dispersion. Evidence from the Spanish hotel industry

Coll, Jacint Balaguer; Pernías, José C. - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2010

Based on the assumption that location is especially relevant in the lodging industry, we exploit a dataset of Spanish hotels to examine the relationship between spatial competition and retail price level and dispersion. Our results support the hypothesis that a greater density of competitors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602615

MERGERS IN A PARTIALLY CARTELIZED MARKET

Escrihuela, Marc - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2003

The paper studies a Partial Cartel model where only a subset of firms colludes. In this model, firms' ability to … horizontal mergers on profits and welfare in a Partially Cartelized market. We show that both mergers among fringe and cartel … firms increase market price. Regarding merger profitability, the discount factor decreases cartel members' merger …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812852

Endogenous quality choice under upstream market power

Sánchez, Borja Mesa - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2010

This paper analyzes how the existence of upstream market power affects endogenous quality choice in a setting where two downstream firms are locked in a bilateral monopoly with their own input suppliers. The main result is that the degree of product differentiation is reduced as upstream market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008752934

Collusion, competition and piracy

Martínez-Sánchez, Francisco - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2009

sufficiently. We alsoshow that a lower cost of copying facilitates collusion but that a higherquality of the copy hinders collusion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082634

The role of the interchange fee on the effect of forbidding price discrimination of ATM services

Faulí-Oller, Ramón - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2008

We consider whether banks should be allowed to set different ATM prices to their customers depending on whether they hold an account on the bank. In Massoud and Bernhardt (2002), without considering an interchange fee, a ban on price discrimination on ATM services increases total surplus. In the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515910

TESTING COLLUSIVE PRICES IN A MULTIMARKET CONTEXT: THE EUROPEAN CASE OF VITAMIN C

Balaguer, Jacint; Jiménez, Ezequiel Uriel; Orts, Vicente - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2005

In this paper, we suggest a method to test price-fixing agreements. Prices fixed to multiple shipments are decomposed into a set of destination market effects and time effects in order to allow us to perform an analysis of residuals. We examine the pricing behavior of vitamin C in the European...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731109

MERGING TO LICENSE: INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL PATENTEE

Faulí-Oller, Ramón; Sandonís, Joel - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2003

In this paper, we endogenize the decision of a research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation on whether to remain independent as an external patentee or to merge with a manufacturing firm, becoming an internal to the industry patentee. We show that a merger is profitable only for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515935

Capacity restriction by retailers

Faulí-Oller, Ramón - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2008

A monopolist retailer facing two suppliers producing two symmetric and independent goods improves its bargaining position by commiting to sell only one good. We analyze if this advantage extends to the case where there are two undierentiated retailers competing in the same market. With linear...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731374

Mergers of retailers with limited selling capacity

Faulí-Oller, Ramón - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2009

We consider two (symmetric) upstream firms producing independent goods that sell to consumers through symmetric retailers. The distinguishing feature of retailers is that they have a selling capacity, in the sense, that there is an upper limit in the total units of the two goods they can sell....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602630