We analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolistto a continuum of heterogeneous downstream firms. The novelty of ourapproach is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly, whichintroduces an interesting trade-off. As a consequence, partial pricediscrimination arises...

We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show...

Recent empirical evidence provided by Bernard et al. (2010) and Broda and Weinstein (2010) shows that a significant share of product creation and destruction in U.S. industries occurs within existing firms and accounts for a relevant share of aggregate output. In the present paper, and...

In the last decade, the analytical progress achieved in the New Keynesian literature has been remarkable. Many of the early assumptions have been relaxed, leading to medium-scale macroeconomic models that are now able to capture many features of real-world data. Nevertheless, modern-day New...

This paper analyzes the relationship between market structure and performance within the Spanish banking industry. Three different stochastic measures of efficiency are used (based on three alternative distributional assumptions for inefficiency: half-normal, normal-truncated and exponential)....

Competition has long been regarded as productivity enhancing. Understanding the mechanism by which competition affects innovation and productivity is therefore an important topic for economic policy. The main contribution of this paper is to disentangle the relationship between competition and...

I construct a model in which an oligopoly first invests in persuasive advertising in order to induce brand loyalty to consumers who would otherwise buy the cheapest alternative on the market, and then competes in prices. Despite ex-ante symmetry, at equilibrium, there is one firm which chooses a...

We consider an upstream firm selling an input to several downstream firms through observable two-part tariff contracts. Downstream firms can alternatively buy the input from a less efficient source of supply. We show that downstream mergers lead to lower wholesale prices. They translate into...

Salant et al. (1983) showed in a Cournot setting that horizontal mergers are unprofitable because outsiders react by increasing their output. We show that this negative effect may be compensated by the positive effect that horizontal mergers have on the buyer power of merging firms in input markets.

In this paper we get the optimal two-part tariff contract for the licensing of a cost reducing innovation to a differentiated goods industry of a general size. We analyze the cases where the patentee is an independent laboratory or an incumbent firm. We show that, regardless of the number of...