Showing 1 - 10 of 61
In Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement is shown that if the signatories of an international environmental agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731276
This paper examines a situation in which the production activities of different agents, in a common geographical location, create waste products that are either of a similar biological or chemical composition or offer commercially compatible combinations. What we propose here, therefore, is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731381
interactions, direct and indirect reputation and memory constraints that is crucial for the emergence of cooperation. Taken by … itself, none of these mechanisms is sufficient to yield cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008500662
This paper studies, both theoretically and experimentally, frame effects in the context of a public good game in which players have to make a costly contribution either i) to achieve or ii) not to lose a non excludable monetary prize. Our protocol leads to public good provision (not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731306
This work presents a clearer way of solving the optimisation problem addressed by Selden and Song (1995)in order to derive the J curve for abatement. The proposed framework is also extended to a two-country model.Results are consistent, also for the two country case, with empirical evidence that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812835
This paper extends Wirl and Dockner¿s (1995) model designed to analyze the long-term bilateral interdependence between a resource exporting cartel and a coalition of resource importing country governments. Firstly, depletion effects are introduced into the analysis of the intertemporal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212532
This paper presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a coordination game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515886
Using data obtained from experiments reported in García-Gallego (1998) and García- Gallego and Georgantzís (2001), we estimate a simple model of adaptive behavior which could describe pricing in a market whose demand conditions are unknown to the firms. Divergence between the limit of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515893
agreements, then uniqueness (which is a necessary condition for efficiency) is generically achieved. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515942
Alternating bargaining has been extensively used to model two-sidednegotiations. The celebrated model of Rubinstein (1982) has provided a formaljustification for equitable payoff division. A typical assumption of these models underrisk is that the breakdown event means a complete and irrevocable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515962