This paper introduces a property over agents' preferences, called Tops Responsiveness Condition. Such a property guarantees that the core in Hedonic Coalition Formation games is not empty. It is also shown that a mechanism exists that selects a stable allocation. It turns out that this...

This paper analyzes the possibility of irnplementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisins and the hypotesis of agents' behaviour consiclered in the Nash equilibriurn concept . We analyze the possibility of...

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals' preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.

In this paper we present a general result on the convergence to an equilibrium of a class of dynamic adjustment procedures -which includes Gradient Systems and Best Reply Dynamics as special cases- when there are two players and strategy sets are one dimensional. We also show that there are no...

We consider a continuous spatial economy consisting of pure exchange local economies. Agents are allowed to change their location over time as a response to spatial utility differentials. These spatial adjustments toward higher utility neighborhoods lead the spatial economy to converge to a...