Consider an evolutionary context where a given number of quantity-setting oligopolists tend to mimic successful behavior, occasionally experimenting with some small probability. In this context, it is shown that the unique long-run outcome of the process has all firms playing Walrasian, i.e.,...

We examine the influence that the degree of stringency in the promotion processes of hierarchical systems has on the outcome of such selections at both the local and global level. We show that any change in the degree of stringency, whether an increase or a decrease, could cause counterintuitive...

We analyze the long-run outcome of markets in which boundedly rational firms with a decreasingreturns to scale technology compete in prices. The behavior of these firms is based on limitation ofsuccess and experimentation. In this framework, we introduce a new approach to model boundedlyrational...

This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents are locally matched to playa coordination game and can adjust both their strategy and location. Their decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy optimally to...

This paper introduces expectations into the framework of evolutionary games. On the one hand, (myopic) players are assumed to behave optimally according to the expectations they hold at each point of the process. On the other hand, expectations themselves are continuously updated according to...

This paper analyzes the effect of the power of the chairman and CEO on firm risk. As proxies of power several variables have been employed: the fact that a person accumulates both the CEO and the Chairman titles, the fact of CEO or Chairman being founders, their tenure, their shareholding and...

This paper addresses the following issue: If a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives 'in the shadow' of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a 'winning coalition' supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: What influence can...