In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no social rule which is efficient, nondictatorial and...

Many policies simultaneously affect the distribution of prices and incomes in the economy. Moreover, a bias may occur when there is a stochastic relationship between prices and incomes and this relationship is being ignored. It is therefore important to dispose of an analytical framework for...

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. Two natural procedures (up methods and temporary satisfaction methods) are proposed to solve these problems. They are constructed by using priority methods on the cartesian product of agents and...

There exist congenital diseases that reduce newborns' potential opportunities. This reduction is sometimes alleviated if the congenital disease is early detected thanks to a newborn screening program. We propose an outcome measurement of newborn screening programs based on the opportunity gains...

We consider the problem of allocating m(m=2) infinitely divisible commodities among agents with single-peaked preferences. In the two-agents case any strategy-proof and efficient solution is dictatorial. First, we propose a solution that, in the two-agents case, is the only one that satisfies...

Choice functions on tournaments always select the maximal element (Condorcet winner), provided they exist, but this property does not hold in the more general case of weak tournaments. In this paper we analyze the relationship between the usual choice functions and the set of maximal elements in...

This paper studies convergence and stability properties of Sjöström's (1994) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic learning dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions in...

The literature on vouchers often concludes that a voucher-based system cannot be the outcome of a majority vote. This paper shows that it is possible to propose selective vouchers (of exogenous value) such that the majority of voters are in favour of selective vouchers. As long as the...

We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers'...

We experimentally investigate the effect of population viscosity (an increased probability to interact with others of one's type or group) on cooperation in a standard prisoner's dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups that differ in the defector gain in the...