In this paper the optimal policy and the stability of a tariff agreement among the importers of a monopolized good that is sold in an integrated market are studied. To analyze the stability, the tariff agreement formation is modelled as a two-stage game. In the first stage each importer decides...

This article considers a two-sided private information model. We assume that two exogenouslygiven qualities are offered in a monopolistic market. Prices are fixed. A low quality seller choosesto be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higherprice). We...

In this paper we model the case of an international non-renewable resource monopolist as a differential game between the monopolist and the governments of the importing countries, and we investigate whether a tariff on the resource importations can be advantageous for the importing countries. We...

This article considers a two-sided private information model. We assume that two exogenously given qualities are offered in a monopolistic market. Prices are ¿xed. A low quality seller chooses to be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higher price)....

We analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolistto a continuum of heterogeneous downstream firms. The novelty of ourapproach is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly, whichintroduces an interesting trade-off. As a consequence, partial pricediscrimination arises...

In this paper, we suggest a method to test price-fixing agreements. Prices fixed to multiple shipments are decomposed into a set of destination market effects and time effects in order to allow us to perform an analysis of residuals. We examine the pricing behavior of vitamin C in the European...

The stationary sunspot equilibria of a simple OLG economy with heterogeneous agents areconsidered. These equilibria are known to be suboptimal. The focus of the paper is on the efficacy,based on welfare economic considerations and informational requirements, of government policy insuch an...

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. Two natural procedures (up methods and temporary satisfaction methods) are proposed to solve these problems. They are constructed by using priority methods on the cartesian product of agents and...

We consider general OLG economies under uncertainty, with dividend paying assets of infinite maturity and money, and in which one good is available for consumption. We study the optimality properties of equilibria when asset markets are allowed to be sequentially incomplete. We show that if...

We consider pure exchange, one good OLG economies under stationary Markov uncertainty. It is known that when markets are sequentially complete, a stationary equilibrium at which the agents common matrix of intertemporal rates of substitution has a Perron root which is less than or equal to one...