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PSEUDORANDOM PROCESSES: ENTROPY AND AUTOMATA

Urbano, Amparo; Hernández, Penélope - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2001

complexity of the finite automata and the entropy associated to the underlying coordination process. The equilibrium play … achieve the Folk Theorem payoffs, i.e., which are the maximum bounds on automata complexity which yield cooperative behavior … designed by tools of Information Theory. Moreover, the characterization of this set is given by the complexity of the weaker …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731211

Codification schemes and finite automata

Salvador, Amparo Urbano; Rojas, Penélope Hernández - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2000

This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design both of communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by boundedly rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731205

COMMUNICATION AND AUTOMATA

Urbano, Amparo; Hernández, Penélope - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2001

with automata complexity lying between the ones already offered in the literature. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731230

COORDINATION THROUGH DE BRUIJN SEQUENCES

Gossner, Olivier; Hernández, Penélope - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2005

Let µ be a rational distribution over a finite alphabet, and ( ) be a n-periodic sequences which first n elements are drawn i.i.d. according to µ. We consider automata of bounded size that input and output at stage t. We prove the existence of a constant C such that, whenever , with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731250

OPTIMAL USE OF COMMUNICATION RESOURCES

Gossner, Olivier; Neyman, Abraham; Hernández, Penélope - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2005

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731241