In this paper we consider the effect of union structure on the adoption of innovation in the context of Cournot duopoly. With a market size large enough we show that the incentive to innovate is higher under a decentralized union structure (with each firm facing its own independent union) than...

The paper studies a Partial Cartel model where only a subset of firms colludes. In this model, firms' ability to collude depends on the discount factor. In addition, as hardly any attention has been given by the literature to the case where mergers take place in a collusive framework, the...

We consider whether banks should be allowed to set different ATM prices to their customers depending on whether they hold an account on the bank. In Massoud and Bernhardt (2002), without considering an interchange fee, a ban on price discrimination on ATM services increases total surplus. In the...

In a three-stage duopoly game with product design at stage 1, advertising & marketing at stage 2, and price competition at stage 3, advertising & marketing enable customers to distinguish the goods from each other thus relaxing price competition. The subgame perfect equilibria of the three stage...

This paper presents evidence on the impact of bank-specific, regulatory, institutional, macro and financial development variables on competition in banking, using information at both national and bank level. With this aim, Lerner indices of market power are estimated using a sample of 10,479...

In this paper we analyze incentives to invest in capacity prior to asequence of Cournot spot markets with varying demand. We compareequilibrium investment in the absence and in presence of the possibility to tradeon forward markets. We find that the possibility to trade forwards...