We study a dynamic process where agents in a network interact in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The network not only mediates interactions, but also information: agents learn from their own experience and that of their neighbors in the network about the past behavior of others. Each agent can only...

This paper presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a coordination game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not...

This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design both of communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by boundedly rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both...

In this paper (reinforcement) learning of decision makers that face many different games is studied. As learning separately for all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents are assumed to partition the set of all games into analogy classes. Partitions of higher...

This paper presents a model of network formation with costly links. We endogenize the amount of cost born by each player involved in a bilateral link by considering that these shares result from bargaining. We analyze this feature in a context of coordination games. We show that, if the cost of...

Agents involved in the formation of a social or economic network typically face uncertainty about the benefits of creating a link. However, the interplay of such uncertainty and risk attitudes has been neglected in the network formation literature. We propose a dynamic network formation model...

The matching of individuals in teams is a key element in the functioning of an economy. The network of social ties can potentially transmit important information on abilities and reputations and also help mitigate matching frictions by facilitating interactions among ¿screened¿ individuals. We...

This paper studies a complete-market version of the neoclassical growth model, where agents face idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. We show that if agents possess identical preferences of either the CRRA or the addilog type, then the heterogeneous-agent economy behaves as if there was a...

I present and study an evolutionary model of immigration and culturaltransmission of social norms in a set-up where agents are repeatedly matchedto play a one-shot interaction prisoner´s dilemma. Matching can be non-randomdue to limited integration (or population viscosity). The latter refers...

This paper surveys some recent developments in the literature which studies continuous-timeevolutionary dynamics in the context of economic modeling.