Counterfactual decompositions allow the researcher to analyze the changes in wage distributions by discriminating between the effect of changes in the population characteristics and the effect of changes in returns to these characteristics. In this paper, counterfactual distributions are derived...

This paper studies an auction model in which one of the bidders, the insider, has better information about a common component of the value of the good for sale, than the other bidders, the outsiders. Our main result shows that the insider may have incentives to disclose her private information...

We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a single-unit sale when the efficient allocation is not implementable. This allocation may involve no selling when it is efficient to sell. We then show that the English auction always implements...

This paper studies the incentives of a bidder to acquire information in anauction when her information acquisition decision is observed by the otherbidders before they bid. Our results show that the sealed bid (second price)auction induces more information acquisition about a common component...

In the context of the recent electricity market reforms in Europe and the US, we evaluate the performance of the Spanish pool. Our method is not based on price-cost estimates but rather on the different behavior of operators with higher market power as compared to the behavior of more...

We present the asymptotic properties of double-stage quantile regression estimators with random regressors, where the first stage is based on quantile regressions with the same quantile as in the second stage, which ensures robustness of the estimation procedure. We derive invariance properties...

While it has long been recognized that active management is an important issue in the area of mutual fund performance, little consensus has been reached about the value managers’ abilities can add. This study attempts to explore both fund and manager characteristics in order to understand...

We analyze the problem of selling shares of a divisible good to a large number of buyers when demand is uncertain. We characterize equilibria of two popular mechanisms, a fixed price mechanism and a uniform price auction, and compare the revenues. While in the auction truthful bidding is a...

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the...