Two retailers operate in a monopsonistic, oligopolistic environment. They have to buy from spatially dispersed suppliers and use uniform pricing downstream. We characterize prices and location in the two-stage location-then-price game under two different pricing policies in the upstream market:...

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with incomplete information is developed.It is assumed that voters care about the distribu-tion of votes among the two candidates. Votershave an incomplete infor-mation about the distribution of voters´ types. We provide conditions...

Based on the assumption that location is especially relevant in the lodging industry, we exploit a dataset of Spanish hotels to examine the relationship between spatial competition and retail price level and dispersion. Our results support the hypothesis that a greater density of competitors...

We consider a number of individual, discrete consumers, deciding their location on Hotelling's line in a non-cooperative way. Agglomeration emerges as a non-cooperative equilibrium, implying high transportation costs. No restriction is required concerning the functional forrn of transport costs...

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme position s of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise...

This paper looks at the endogenous formation of airline alliances bymeans of a two-stage game where first airlines decide whether to form analliance and then fares are determined. We analyze the profitability and thestrategic effects of airline alliances when two complementary...

The paper formalizes the observation that submarkets for high-quality and low-quality variants are markedly different from each other. We study a simple model where variants of low quality cannot be horizontally differentiated, whereas customers disagree about the value of variants in the...

Two one-product firms compete in prices on a market with differentiated products. Goods are differentiated because customers switch from one good to the other at different relative prices. With the specification that mean demand in the market is unit-elastic 1 pro vide conditions on the shape of...

I show the uniqueness of equilibrium for a class of oligopoly models with strategic complements.Product differentiation models are considered in which the contraction mapping theorem cannotnecessarily be applied.