In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good. We show that, for two agents, there is no social rule which is efficient, nondictatorial and...

Many policies simultaneously affect the distribution of prices and incomes in the economy. Moreover, a bias may occur when there is a stochastic relationship between prices and incomes and this relationship is being ignored. It is therefore important to dispose of an analytical framework for...

We consider a continuous spatial economy consisting of pure exchange local economies. Agents are allowed to change their location over time as a response to spatial utility differentials. These spatial adjustments toward higher utility neighborhoods lead the spatial economy to converge to a...

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals' preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.

In this paper we present a general result on the convergence to an equilibrium of a class of dynamic adjustment procedures -which includes Gradient Systems and Best Reply Dynamics as special cases- when there are two players and strategy sets are one dimensional. We also show that there are no...