This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudent´ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.

This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act strategically only individually rational outcomes should be expected. Moreover, If agents can form unions, thereby gaining the possibility to commit on the decision to be chosen, only stable allocations are...

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in...

This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations in the core of matching markets. We analyze some sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act...

We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simplesequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then ,each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents'preferences are additive,...

In the context of the recent electricity market reforms in Europe and the US, we evaluate the performance of the Spanish pool. Our method is not based on price-cost estimates but rather on the different behavior of operators with higher market power as compared to the behavior of more...

This paper analyses the effect of bank relationships on the interest rate and personaland real guarantees borne by a sample of small and medium-sized enterprises in theirindebtedness. The results of this paper indicate that the SMEs that work with fewer financialintermediaries obtain debt at a...