Firms willing to enter a market with a new product often face the problem that the market does notknow its quality. Selling through a retailer might avoid excessive entry costs by renting thereputation of an incumbent. The incumbent can apply excusive dealing clauses to his retailer. Weshow that...

The model of the circular road has proved to be a popular model of oligopolistic interaction, yet its theoretical properties are not fully explored. In this paper I extend the uniqueness result of price equilibrium in the circular road with equidistant locations from quadratic transportation...

The paper formalizes the observation that submarkets for high-quality and low-quality variants are markedly different from each other. We study a simple model where variants of low quality cannot be horizontally differentiated, whereas customers disagree about the value of variants in the...

In a three-stage duopoly game with product design at stage 1, advertising & marketing at stage 2, and price competition at stage 3, advertising & marketing enable customers to distinguish the goods from each other thus relaxing price competition. The subgame perfect equilibria of the three stage...

Two one-product firms compete in prices on a market with differentiated products. Goods are differentiated because customers switch from one good to the other at different relative prices. With the specification that mean demand in the market is unit-elastic 1 pro vide conditions on the shape of...

I show the uniqueness of equilibrium for a class of oligopoly models with strategic complements.Product differentiation models are considered in which the contraction mapping theorem cannotnecessarily be applied.

In a model of price competition single-product ¯rms compete for consumers. Consumerspurchase a variable quantity of one of the di®erentiated goods. The paper provides results onequilibrium existence when consumers are heterogeneous in their evaluation of the di®erentiatedgoods among each...

Consumer behavior in differentiated product markets can be specified following the Lancastriancharacteristics approach or following Hotelling´s approach of spatial competition. In the case ofunit demand I present a class of models of (heterogeneous) consumer behavior which can bewritten as...

Two retailers operate in a monopsonistic, oligopolistic environment. They have to buy from spatially dispersed suppliers and use uniform pricing downstream. We characterize prices and location in the two-stage location-then-price game under two different pricing policies in the upstream market:...

In models of product differentiation and location models it is implicitly assumed that consumers can afford to buy the differentiated goods in the market. I show that with income heterogeneity there are severe existence problems of a price equilibrium in models of horizontal product...