We implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simplesequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then ,each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents'preferences are additive,...

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can be formed. Finally, we study economies in...

This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations in the core of matching markets. We analyze some sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act...

We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a single-unit sale when the efficient allocation is not implementable. This allocation may involve no selling when it is efficient to sell. We then show that the English auction always implements...

This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudent´ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.

This paper studies simple hiring procedures for job markets. We show that when agents act strategically only individually rational outcomes should be expected. Moreover, If agents can form unions, thereby gaining the possibility to commit on the decision to be chosen, only stable allocations are...

This paper reports an experimental investigation on two mechanisms for the so-called King Solomon Dilemma, where one of them fails to implement the social choice rule dynamically. We compare the two mechanisms in terms of their welfare, incentive and learning properties.

In this paper (reinforcement) learning of decision makers that face many different games is studied. As learning separately for all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents are assumed to partition the set of all games into analogy classes. Partitions of higher...

This paper surveys some recent developments in the literature which studies continuous-timeevolutionary dynamics in the context of economic modeling.

This paper proposes an aspiration-based model for (anonymous) cooperation where a large population of agents are re-matched every period to playa Prisoner's Dilemma. At each point in time, agents hold a certain common aspiration level which is updated on the basis of population-average...