This paper reports an experimental investigation on two mechanisms for the so-called King Solomon Dilemma, where one of them fails to implement the social choice rule dynamically. We compare the two mechanisms in terms of their welfare, incentive and learning properties.

This paper introduces &tao;-fairness as a compromise solution reconciling Pareto efficiency and equity in School Choice Problems. We show that, by considering a weak notion of equity that we refer to as ¿-equity, it is possible to contribute positively to solve an open debate, originated by the...

The form of the Engel curve has long been a subject of discussion in appliedeconometrics and until now there has no been definitive conclusion about its form. In this paperan additive partially linear model is used to estimate semiparametrically the effect of totalexpenditure in the context of...

This paper presents a model of network formation with costly links. We endogenize the amount of cost born by each player involved in a bilateral link by considering that these shares result from bargaining. We analyze this feature in a context of coordination games. We show that, if the cost of...

Equilibrium selection in the Nash demand game is investigated in a learning context with persistent randomness. I adopt a matching framework similar to Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and assume that individuals belong to populations of different sizes. Despite the myopic behavior of...

This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We identify four natural conditions on individuals' preferences and show that, under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists.

We present in this work a survey on sequential bargaining models with complete information that explain inefficiencies, frequently observed and with great economic impact, such as strikes, the establishment of commitments and the intransigent position of the negotiators. Furthermore, we pose...

We study strategic communication in a sender-receiver gamein which the sender sends a message about the observed quality ofthe good to the receiver who may accept or reject the good without knowing the true quality or the sender's type. The game has infinitely many perfect Bayesian Nash...

This paper presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a coordination game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not...

In this paper we have introduced and parameterized the concept of ?group cohesion? in a model of local interaction with a population divided into groups. This allows us to control the level of ?isolation? of these groups: We thus analyze if the degree of group cohesion is relevant to achieve an...