Showing 1 - 10 of 52
We analyze the problem of selling shares of a divisible good to a large number of buyers when demand is uncertain. We characterize equilibria of two popular mechanisms, a fixed price mechanism and a uniform price auction, and compare the revenues. While in the auction truthful bidding is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515896
This paper investigates the relationship between board of directors¿characteristics and firm value. We find a positive relationship between board ofdirectors¿ shareholdings and Tobin¿s Q. Endogenous treatment of these variables alsoreveals a positive relationship between Tobin¿s Q and board...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515805
We examine demand behaviour for intertemporal dependencies, using Spanishpanel data. We present evidence that there is both state dependence and correlatedheterogeneity in demand behaviour. Our specific findings are that food outside thehome, alcohol and tobacco are habit forming whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212566
This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multiunit auction in which some bidders are better informed than others. We show that bidders with worse information can do surprisingly well: They can win with higher probability than better...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212583
We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest games. This family of contest games relies both on relative efforts (as Tullock's proposal) and on absolute effort differences (as difference-form contests). An additional desirable feature is that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212589
This paper studies an auction model in which one of the bidders, the insider, has better information about a common component of the value of the good for sale, than the other bidders, the outsiders. Our main result shows that the insider may have incentives to disclose her private information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731219
We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a single-unit sale when the efficient allocation is not implementable. This allocation may involve no selling when it is efficient to sell. We then show that the English auction always implements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731223
We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731259
We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731316
This paper studies the incentives of a bidder to acquire information in anauction when her information acquisition decision is observed by the otherbidders before they bid. Our results show that the sealed bid (second price)auction induces more information acquisition about a common component...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731348