This article considers a two-sided private information model. We assume that two exogenouslygiven qualities are offered in a monopolistic market. Prices are fixed. A low quality seller choosesto be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higherprice). We...

This article considers a two-sided private information model. We assume that two exogenously given qualities are offered in a monopolistic market. Prices are ¿xed. A low quality seller chooses to be either honest (by charging the lower market price) or dishonest (by charging the higher price)....

The main advantages of a laboratory financial market with respect to field data are: (i) it allows us a perfect monitoring of the available information to each subject at any moment in time, and (ii) it gives us the possibility of recording subjects' trading activity in the market. In our...

This study examines the reactions of the Spanish capital market and financial analysts to CEO presentations organized by the Spanish Society of Financial Analysts. The sample contains 156 presentations that took place during the period 1994-2000. To estimate the effect of these meetings -on...

The poor stock price performance of firms that raise capital through seasoned equity offerings is one of the recent puzzles in financial literature. In this study we investigate whether pre-issue earnings management can explain these results for rights issues in Spain. Consistent with this...

In recent years, users' information needs have changed, and forward-looking information has become of great importance, as it has been highlighted in many international and national reports. Nonetheless, Spanish regulations are not very specific in this respect, since although it is required to...

We study the incentive problem between the owners of a firm and its CEO's due to the unobservability of the manager's actions. Our model departs from the literature in two ways. First, we acknowledge that, in contrast with standard repeated moral hazard models, actions taken by CEO's have a...

Determining the degree of informational asymmetry is a major topic in the literature of modern microstructure. In this paper, we review and analyze the suitability of the models for estimating the probability of informed trading [Easley et al., 1996; Nyholm, 2002, 2003]. The empirical analysis is...

This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multiunit auction in which some bidders are better informed than others. We show that bidders with worse information can do surprisingly well: They can win with higher probability than better...

This paper explains financial contagion between two stock markets with uncorrelated fundamentals by fluctuations in international investors’ attention allocation. We model the process of attention allocation that underlies portfolio investment in international markets using investors who face...