This paper surveys some recent developments in the literature which studies continuous-timeevolutionary dynamics in the context of economic modeling.

This paper is a note in which we prove that Cellular Automata are suitable tools to model multi-agent interactive procedures. In particular, we apply the argument to validate results from simulation tools obtained for the classical model of segregation of Thomas Schelling (1971a).

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...

We introduce an algorithm for solving dynamic economic models that merges stochastic simulation and projection approaches: we use simulation to approximate the ergodic measure of the solution, we construct a fixed grid covering the support of the constructed ergodic measure, and we use...

We introduce an envelope condition method (ECM) for solving dynamic programming problems. The ECM method is simple to implement, dominates conventional value function iteration and is comparable in accuracy and cost to Carroll’s (2005) endogenous grid method. Codes are available.

We study a dynamic process where agents in a network interact in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The network not only mediates interactions, but also information: agents learn from their own experience and that of their neighbors in the network about the past behavior of others. Each agent can only...

This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design both of communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by boundedly rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both...

In this paper (reinforcement) learning of decision makers that face many different games is studied. As learning separately for all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents are assumed to partition the set of all games into analogy classes. Partitions of higher...

This paper presents a model of network formation with costly links. We endogenize the amount of cost born by each player involved in a bilateral link by considering that these shares result from bargaining. We analyze this feature in a context of coordination games. We show that, if the cost of...

This paper presents a model in which players interact via the formation of costly links and the benefits of bilateral interactions are determined by a coordination game. A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not...