We construct a general-equilibrium version of Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rulland Violante’s (2000) model with capital-skill complementarity. To account forgrowth patterns observed in the data, we assume several sources of growthsimultaneously, specifically, exogenous growth of skilled and...

We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers'...

We experimentally investigate the effect of population viscosity (an increased probability to interact with others of one's type or group) on cooperation in a standard prisoner's dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups that differ in the defector gain in the...

We study a dynamic process where agents in a network interact in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The network not only mediates interactions, but also information: agents learn from their own experience and that of their neighbors in the network about the past behavior of others. Each agent can only...

This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design both of communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by boundedly rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both...

This paper is a note in which we prove that Cellular Automata are suitable tools to model multi-agent interactive procedures. In particular, we apply the argument to validate results from simulation tools obtained for the classical model of segregation of Thomas Schelling (1971a).

This paper studies the problem of spreading a product (an idea or a technology) among agents in a social network. An agent obtains the product with a probability that depends on the spreading rate (or degree of contagion) of the product as well as on the behaviour of the agent?s neighbours. This...

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium...

This paper studies the properties of solutions to a log-linearized version of the neoclassical growth model with quasi-geometric discounting. We show that after the log-linearization, the model has indeterminacy and multiplicity of equilibria even though the original non-linear model has a...

In this paper (reinforcement) learning of decision makers that face many different games is studied. As learning separately for all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents are assumed to partition the set of all games into analogy classes. Partitions of higher...