In a three-stage duopoly game with product design at stage 1, advertising & marketing at stage 2, and price competition at stage 3, advertising & marketing enable customers to distinguish the goods from each other thus relaxing price competition. The subgame perfect equilibria of the three stage...

Two retailers operate in a monopsonistic, oligopolistic environment. They have to buy from spatially dispersed suppliers and use uniform pricing downstream. We characterize prices and location in the two-stage location-then-price game under two different pricing policies in the upstream market:...

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with incomplete information is developed.It is assumed that voters care about the distribu-tion of votes among the two candidates. Votershave an incomplete infor-mation about the distribution of voters´ types. We provide conditions...

Based on the assumption that location is especially relevant in the lodging industry, we exploit a dataset of Spanish hotels to examine the relationship between spatial competition and retail price level and dispersion. Our results support the hypothesis that a greater density of competitors...

We consider a number of individual, discrete consumers, deciding their location on Hotelling's line in a non-cooperative way. Agglomeration emerges as a non-cooperative equilibrium, implying high transportation costs. No restriction is required concerning the functional forrn of transport costs...

A one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with endogenous party formation is developed. It is proved that at equilibrium there are only two parties. These parties propose alternatives in the extreme position s of the policy space. The adopted policy, however, is a compromise...