The aim of this paper is to analyze whether some of the empirical implications of the Berger and Udell's (1998) financial growth cycle hold. We use a sample of 22.842 observations for year 2003 and test several hypothesis through MANOVA analysis. Results show that companies tend to have...

Determining the degree of informational asymmetry is a major topic in the literature of modern microstructure. In this paper, we review and analyze the suitability of the models for estimating the probability of informed trading [Easley et al., 1996; Nyholm, 2002, 2003]. The empirical analysis is...

We examine an adverse selection relationship in which the principal is unaware of the ex ante distribution of the agent's types. We show that the minimax regret mechanism, which is an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that minimizes the maximal principal's regret, requires...

We analyze managerial contracts (i.e. incentive schemes based on a linear combination of profits and sales) under asymmetric information about costs. In the competitive setting with ex ante symmetric information, standard strategic effects appear. Under adverse selection in both, monopolistic...

We study an adverse selection model, with a principal and several agents, wherecontracting is under asymmetric information. The number of agents is finite and types are "continuous" and independent. We analyze two settings. In the first one, the performance functions of mechanisms may depend on...

This paper studies the principal-multiagent model of a firm subject to adverse selection. We focus on agents who have complete information. We propose some desirable properties to be satisfied by mechanisms implementing the first-best in Nash equilibrium: (i) enforceability (a property related...

This paper tests Bester's (1985, 1987) prediction about the separating role ofcontracts that involve both interest rates and collateral in credit markets. To test thisprediction we use data from natural credit markets and controlled experiments. Using asample of credits to small and medium size...

We study a model in which risk-averse consumers obtain mutual insurance by participating voluntarily in pools. More precisely, consumers commit to contributing a fraction of their future uncertain endowment to a common pool. In exchange, they gain the right to receive a share of the total return...