Abstract. Considered here is direct exchange of production allowances or input factors. Motivated by practical modelling and compution, we sup- pose every owner or user of such items has a linear technology. The issue then is whether competitive market equilibrium can be reached merely via...

A two-agent model for the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock is developed to investigate the economic benefits that can be realized from resources , and the effect of exploitation on stock sustainability under cooperation and non-cooperation.

So-called potential functions are important, prominent, and common to many diverses fields, including optimization, dynamic processes, and physics. Monderer and Shapley have recently added a class of noncooperative games to that list. We extend their notion and consider repeated play of games...

The main objects below are transferable-utility games in which each agent faces an optimization problem, briefly called production planning, constrained by his resource endowment. Coalitions can pool members's resources. Such production games are here extended to accomodate uncertainty about...

We model repeated play of noncooperative stage games in terms of approximate gradient steps. That simple format require little information and no optimization. Moreover, it allows players to evaluate marginal cost or profit inexactly and to move with different velocities. Uncertainty can also be...

Accomodated here is a measure space of economic agents, each regarded as a profit maximizing producer, each endowed with his technology and resource bundle. Pooling of private endowments generates a cooperative game with side payments.

We provide a new and simple convergence analysis for fictitious play of two-person, two-strategy games. Some generalizations are also given.

Owners of stochastic assets can pool their endowments to smoothen and insure individual payoffs across outcomes and time. We explore, in such a setting, how contingent shadow prices on aggregate resources can be used for three purposes: first, to design mutual contracts for risk averse agents;...

Markets for environmental externalities are typically closely related to the markets causing such externalities, whereupon strategic interaction may result. Along these lines, the market for Green Certificates is strongly interwoven in the electricity market as the producers of green electricity...

Abstract. This paper considers a fairly large class of noncooperative games in which strategies are jointly constrained. When what is called the Ky Fan or Nikaidô-Isoda function is convex-concave, selected Nash equilibria correspond to diagonal saddle points of that function. This feature is...