Main objects here are normal-form games, featuring uncertainty and noncooperative players who entertain local visions, form local approximations, and hesitate in making large, swift adjustments. For the purpose of reaching Nash equilibrium, or learning such play, we advocate and illustrate an...

Abstract. Considered here is direct exchange of production allowances or input factors. Motivated by practical modelling and compution, we sup- pose every owner or user of such items has a linear technology. The issue then is whether competitive market equilibrium can be reached merely via...

The paper analyses cooperative games with side payments. Each player facesa possibly non-convex optimization problem, interpreted as production planning, constrained by his resources or technology. Coalitions can aggreagate members' contributions. We discuss instances where such aggregation...

A special class of cooperative transferable-utility games where each agent faces an optimization problem constrained by resources that can be pooled among coalition members, so-called production games, are here extended and applied in novel ways. First, I relax linearity requirements; second, I...

Pooling and exchange of random resources may offer the owners insurance and substitution. Greater efficiency and more stable revenues thereby obtain. These good properties derive from a sharing rule that complies with the core concept from cooperative production games. It is applied here to...

The use of renewable resources is examined as a cooperative production game, the focus here being on fisheries. It is shown how pooling and exchange of individual endowments may open for substitutions that generate greater efficiency. We introduce a sharing rule that complies with the core...

Abstract. Exchange of risks is considered here as a transferableutility, cooperative game, featuring risk averse players. Like in competitive equilibrium, a core solution is determined by shadow prices on state-dependent claims. And like in finance, no risk can properly be priced only in terms...

This paper discusses coalition formation with side payments in markets for transferable property rights where strategic agents prevail on both sides of the market. Our concern is emissions permit trading under the Kyoto Protocol. While a seller cartel is not profitable, our analysis indicates...

Focus is here on coalitional games among economic agents plagued by aggregate pollutions of diverse sorts. Defecting players presumably pollute more than others. Then, granted convex preferences and technologies, the core is proven nonempty. In fact, under natural assumptions, a specific,...

Many economic models and optimization problems generate (endogenous) shadow prices - alias dual variables or Lagrange multipliers. Frequently the “slopes” of resulting price curves - that is, multiplier derivatives - are of great interest. These objects relate to the Jacobian of the...