In a model of incomplete, heterogeneous information, with externalities and strategic interactions, we analyze the possibility for learning to act as coordination device. We build on the framework proposed by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and extend it to a dynamic multiperiod setting where agents...

Using data from a randomized experiment in rural China, this paper studies the influence of social networks on weather insurance adoption and the mechanisms through which social networks operate. To quantify network effects, the experiment offers intensive information sessions about the...

In this paper we investigate how cognitive ability influences behavior, success and the evolution of play towards Nash equilibrium in repeated strategic interactions. We study behavior in a p-beauty contest experiment and find striking differences according to cognitive ability: more cognitively...

Bidders in procurement auctions often face avoidable fixed costs. This can make bidding decisions complex and risky, and market outcomes volatile. If bidders deviate from risk neutral best responses, either due to faulty optimization or risk attitudes, then equilibrium predictions can perform...

This paper provides evidence for spillovers in learning and behavior within urban slums in Chandigarh, India. In an experiment, mothers of children (aged 3-6 years) enrolled in government day-care centers were provided recipe books to lower their price per calorie. Theory suggests that if...

We recognize the comments made by Horwitz (2010) and Koppl (2010) in their replies to D'Amico and Boettke (2010), "Making Sense out of The Sensory Order." Furthermore, this paper hopes to explain what role D'Amico and Boettke do see for cognitive neuroscience in the study of Austrian Economics....

A classic argument in economics is that experience in the market place will eliminate mistakes and cognitive biases. Internet auctions are a popular market were some bidders gather extensive experience. In a unique data set from a Scandinavian auction site I question if and what bidders learn....

We examine the issue of learning in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. We show that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more information about his private type. Moreover, the outcome of the Bayesian mechanism regulating the...

Many disasters are foreshadowed by insufficient preventative care. In this paper, we argue that there is a true problem of prevention, in that insufficient care is often the result of rational calculations on the part of agents. We identify three factors that lead to dubious efforts in care....

The objective of this paper is to propose a multidisciplinary approach for the analysis of demand and innovation. It combines insights from studies on technology diffusion, evolutionary economics and cognitive psychology to argue that consumption and demand are learning processes driven by...