This study provides an overview of the legal, institutional, and regulatory framework that countries should put in place to address cases of bank insolvency. It is primarily intended to inform the work of the staffs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and to provide guidance...

Developing an effective framework for cross-border resolution is a key priority in international regulatory reform. Large bank failures during the global financial crisis brought home the lack of adequate tools for resolving 'too-big-to-fail' institutions. In cross-border cases, misaligned...

Banking crises have led many countries to consider deposit insuranceschemes to protect depositors and the banking system itself from the impact of bank failures. But should society be unconditionally responsible for underwiting banking decisions, even those imprudentlytaken? This paper considers...

Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such ""regulatory capture"" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a ""captured"" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to...

The scramble to expand deposit guarantees in Europe in response to recent financial turmoil confirms that the on-going integration of European financial markets requires closer coordination of prudential policies and financial safety nets. We study the optimal design of prudential supervision...

The profound structural reform underway in Eastern Europe has revealed the weakness of the banking sector there; macroeconomic stability and other reforms are thereby threatened. After an overview of recent developments in the banking sectors of these countries, a model is developed that...

This paper presents a technical note on Crisis Management Arrangements for the United States. The crisis has seen widespread systemic instability, large-scale fiscal support, and an increase in moral hazard. The lack of a formal systematic process for the assessment of risks may have contributed...

Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to...

The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context where banks may choose tail risk asserts. We show that this undermines the traditional result that high capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. Moreover, higher capital may have an...

What might interest rate liberalization do to intermediation and the cost of capital in China? China's most binding interest rate control is a ceiling on the deposit rate, although lending rates are also regulated. Through case studies and model-based simulations, we find that liberalization...