Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 277
Cover Image
Corruption, Competition, and Contracts; A Model of Vote Buying
Vardy, Felix J. J.; Morgan, John - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2006
In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248248
Cover Image
Ethnic Diversity, Democracy, and Corruption
Yehoue, Etienne B. - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2007
I study the link between ethnic diversity, democracy, and corruption. In a static model, I show that contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption might emerge as a negative externality of democracy. This occurs through ethnicity, which appears as a rent-extracting technology in a democratic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248127
Cover Image
Colonial Origins, Institutions and Economic Performance in the Caribbean; Guyana and Barbados
DaCosta, Michael - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2007
The countries that were once British colonies in the Caribbean share a common language and a colonial history of slavery, dominance of a plantation-based sugar industry, and broadly similar government and administrative traditions. Following independence in the late-1960s economic strategies and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005263739
Cover Image
Money-Based Versus Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization; Is there Space for Political Opportunism?
Aisen, Ari - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2004
a consumption bust followed by a recovery, policymakers may consider the timing of elections when determining the … nominal anchor for stabilization. This paper finds strong evidence that the choice of nominal anchor depends on elections …, implying the existence of political opportunism. ERBS are, on average, launched before elections while MBS are set after them. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005263919
Cover Image
Votingon the "Optimal" Size of Government
Olters, Jan-Peter - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2000
Viewing fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes, the “economic model of politics” proposes a public choice approach, which does not rely on social welfare functions. With it, a country’s overall budget can be derived...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264039
Cover Image
Electoral System and Public Spending
Perotti, Roberto; Rostagno, Massimo V.; … - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2001
We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We present a model emphasizing the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264182
Cover Image
The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions; Theory and Empirical Evidence
Debrun, Xavier; Kumar, Manmohan S. - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2007
This paper discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline. A dynamic model of fiscal policy shows that optimal institutions lack credibility unless the costs to bypass them are sufficiently high. In our model, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005825631
Cover Image
Rethinking the Governance of the International Monetary Fund
Mirakhor, Abbas; Zaidi, Iqbal Mehdi - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2006
, in the context of voice and voting shares, before international institutions, such as the IMF, are to be justifiable to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005825790
Cover Image
Ghana; Economic Development in a Democratic Environment
Harnack, Joachim; Leite, Sérgio Pereira.; Fabrizio, … - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005767349
Cover Image
Hold Your Nose and Vote; Why Do Some Democracies tolerate Corruption?
Pani, Marco - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2009
This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999974