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Are preferences complete?An experimental measurement of indecisivenessunder risk

Danan, Eric; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

We propose an experimental design allowing a behavioral test of the axiom ofcompleteness of individual preferences. The … preferences are significantly incomplete. We use lotteries as choice alternatives and we find that risk aversion is globally …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866755

Individual and Couple Decision Behavior under Risk:The Power of Ultimate Control

de Palma, André; Picard, Nathalie; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

This paper reports results of an experiment designed to analyze the link between riskydecisions made by couples and … risky decisions made separately by each spouse. We estimateboth the spouses and the couples’ degrees of risk aversion and we … assess how the risk preferencesof the two spouses aggregate when they make risky decisions. This enables us to investigatethe …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866693

Hidden Costs of Control:Three Repetitions and an Extension

Ploner, Matteo; Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) low and medium control treatmentswith 364 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool ofstudents and demographics vary across samples. Our results largely conict with those of theoriginal study. We mainly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005870900

The Hidden Costs of Control:An Unsuccessful Replication Study

Ploner, Matteo; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment.In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units anddecides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principalreceives two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866534

Road Traffic Congestion and Public Information:An Experimental Investigation

Boun My, Kene; Denant-Boèmont, Laurent; Koessler, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

This paper reports two laboratory studies designed to study the impact of public informationabout past departure rates on congestion levels and travel costs. Our experimental design isbased on a discrete version of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey’s (1990) bottleneck model wheresubjects have to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866696

Are preferences incomplete?An experimental study using flexible choices

Danan, Eric; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

Completeness, the most commonly assumed axiom in preference theory,has not received much attention from the experimental literature. Indeed,incomplete preferences model a cognitive phenomenon (an agent's inabilityto compare alternatives), and therefore cannot be directly revealed throughchoice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866783

Fragility of Information Cascades:An Experimental Study using Elicited Beliefs

Koessler, Frédéric; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony; Bracht, Jürgen - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in laboratory experiments.One group of low informed subjects make predictions in sequence. In a matchedpairs design, another set of high informed subjects observe the decisions of the first group andmake predictions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866431

On the Acceptability of the Ambient Tax Mechanism:An Experimental Investigation

Boun My, Kene; Cochard, Francois; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

Our objective in this paper is to assess the acceptability of the ambient tax. Concretely,we ask subjects to choose between (A) an ambient tax and (B) an individual tax system. Incase (A), they actually participate in a game in which their payout depends on all participants'decisions and on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866532

Regulation of Nonpoint Emissions under Limited Information:A Stress Experimental Test of the Ambient Tax Mechanism

Cochard, Francois; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony; Boun My, Kene - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

We provide a stress experimental test of the ability of (a damaged based version) the ambient tax mechanism to induce … functions competing against the same opponents for the duration of the experiment (which runsfor an indeterminate length), and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866868