Similar Search Results

Kondor, Peter - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2004

i.e. there is no noise trader risk. Instead, traders expect that new rational entrants with different information in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884635

Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice

Fischer, Gregory - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011

explore this possibility, I develop a theory that unifies models of investment choice, informal risk sharing, and formal … financial contracts. I then test the predictions of this theory using a series of experiments with clients of a large … inefficiencies. First, borrowers free-ride on their partners, making risky investments without compensating partners for this risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746368

Strategic investment, industry concentration and the cross section of returns

Bustamante, Maria Cecilia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011

competition a¤ects the industrial dynamics of investment, concentration, and expected returns. When firms have similar production …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071300

Costly bargaining and renegotiation

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928645

Coordinating tasks in M-form and U-form organisations

Qian, Yingyi; Roland, Gerard; Xu, Cheng-Gang - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

We model the coordination of specialised tasks inside an organisation as "attribute matching". Using this method, we compare the performance of organisational forms (M-form and U-form) in implementing changes such as innovation and reform. In our framework, organisational forms affect the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928762

Hierarchic contracting

Sanchez, Miguel A.; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

We analyze the contracting structure in a moral hazard setting with several agents where output is produced jointly and is the only contractible variable. Since the salary of each agent is a function of all agents efforts, a positive externality arises between them. This externality is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928768

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745037

Costly coasian contracts

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ‘contractual solution’ to this hold-up problem is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745370

Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis

Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions rights along three time...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745436

Economic policy when models disagree

Barrieu, Pauline; Desgagne, Bernard Sinclair - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009

This paper proposes a general way to conceive public policy when there is no consensual account of the situation of interest. The approach builds on an extension and dual formulation of the traditional theory of economic policy. It does not need a representative policymaker’s utility function...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745638

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last