In this paper we examine the relation between geographic location and innovative behavior.Knowledge spillins, as opposed to knowledge spillovers, are modeled as an externality which existsbetween geographically close economic agents and enters the representative inventor productionfunction...

The primary focus of this paper is the impact of knowledge creation and innovative activity onnon-farm employment growth. Non-farm employment growth is modeled in a stylized modelwhere new knowledge and local economic externalities are key factors driving technologygrowth. For our empirical...

Health diagnosis indicators used as explanatory variables in econometric models often suffer from substantial measurement error. This measurement error can lead to seriously biased inferences about the effects of health conditions on the outcome measure of interest, and the bias generally spills...

The objective of this paper is to identify the impact of public and private agriculturalresearch on multi-output multi-input profit maximizing decisions of Midwestern farmers. The mainhypothesis is that investments in public and private R&D shift outward the supply curves for cropand livestock...

We develop a dynamic duopoly model of R&D competition to improve the quality of a finalgood. The innovation process is sequential and cumulative, and takes place alongside productionin an infinite-horizon setting. In this context we study the R&D incentive impacts resultingfrom a “research...

Faced with real and nominal shocks, what should a benevolent central bankdo, …x the money growth rate or target the inflation rate? In this paper, wemake a …rst attempt at studying the optimal choice of monetary policy in-struments in a micro-founded model of money. Speci…cally, we produce...

This paper studies equilibrium search and learning in a dynamic shing gamethat is played by independent shermen and by members of an information sharingCooperative. Once collected, information about the location of productive sh-ing sites is an excludable public good. We show that independent...

We analyze non-cooperative environmental policy when the only strategic interac-tion between countries is through bilateral transboundary pollution, i.e., countries areclosed or small open economies. When countries set pollution taxes simultaneously,there is no carbon leakage. However, in the...

Ordinarily, the process of decision making by a committee through voting is mod-elled by a monotonic game the range of whose characteristic function is restricted tof0; 1g: The decision rule that governs the collective action of a voting body induces ahierarchy in the set of players in terms of...

The core is reformulated to incorporate the externality typical in strategic formgames. Any coalition of players may deviate by trying to commit to a profile of actionsdifferent from a status quo. The outsiders of the coalition may take a coordinatedmeasure, incentive-feasibly for themselves, to...