We describe the fundamental groups of ordered and unordered k-point sets in C^n generating an affine subspace of fixed dimension.

Marengo and Pasquali (2008) present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained. In this paper we extend and generalize this approach by providing a geometric model of individual...

The paper presents a new framework to assess firm level heterogeneity and to study the rate and direction of technical change. Building on the analysis of revealed short-run production functions by Hildenbrand (1981), we propose the (normalized) volume of the zonotope composed by vectors-firms...

We present a geometric model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an...

Suppose R is the complement of an essential arrangement of toric hyperlanes in the complex torus and ? = ?1(R). We show that H*(R;A) vanishes except in the top degree n when A is one of the following systems of local coefficients: (a) a system of nonresonant coefficients in a complex line...

We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of...

Here the reader can find some basic definitions and notations in order to better understand the model for social choise described by L. Marengo and S. Settepanella in their paper: Social choice among complex objects. The interested reader can refer to [Bou68], [Massey] and [OT92] to go into more...

Marengo and the second author have developed in the last years a geometric model of social choice when this takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, showing that by bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority has the power of determining the social...

Recently, Marengo and Settepanella (2010) introduced a model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements. In this paper we prove that their voting model is highly decidable, i.e. a group of agents that agrees to use such voting process has an high probability to reach a final...