Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

Experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback onthe losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback isnot given. Furthermore, bids tend to be above the equilibrium predictions for riskneutral bidders. While the latter...

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

This paper provides an overview on the simulations andexperiments we have done in order to better understandhuman-agent interaction in a market environment. We findthat the introduction of software agents does not necessarilyinduce a more efficient market. More surprisingly,information on the...

A vast literature shows that individuals frequently fail to identify the normative solutionsin logical reasoning tasks. Much attention has been devoted to the study ofthese deviations at the individual level; less effort was exerted to investigate whetherinstitutional settings might facilitate...