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Framing Effects, Selective Information andMarket Behavior An Experimental Analysis

Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Weber, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2004

The results of an asset market experiment, in which 64 subjects trade two assets oneight markets in a computerized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866816

Specious Confidence after Tax Audits: A Contribution to theDynamics of Compliance

Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Schwarzenberger, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

a tax experiment. Compliance varied significantlyover time: it decreased immediately after an audit and increased …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866915

Costly bargaining and renegotiation

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928645

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745037

Costly coasian contracts

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ‘contractual solution’ to this hold-up problem is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745370

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people? An Experimental Analysis

Albert, Max; Güth, Werner; Kirchler, Erich; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators in an anonymous decision environment by allowing participants to condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoner's dilemma and a trust game (i) on their partner's donation share to a self-selected charity, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867074

Hindsight Bias and Individual RiskAttitude within the Context ofExperimental Asset Markets

El-Sehity, Tarek; Haumer, Hans; Helmenstein, Christian; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

the different experimental risk elicitationmethods of certainty equivalents and binary lottery choices, and (iii) their … general phenomenon. Furthermore,our findings challenge the presumption of time-stable risk preferences and of … proceduralinvariance with respect to different experimental risk elicitation methods. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867042