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Valuing Protection against Low Probability,High Loss Risks: Experimental Evidence

Morone, Andrea; Ozdemir, Ozlem - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

measure,(3)calculates relative risk aversion. The results of the experiment indicate that as theprobability of loss and loss …The study investigates protective responses in low probability and high loss risk situations.Particularly, it (1 … women) are found to be risk aversefor low probabilities. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866644

Voluntary contributions with imperfect information:An experimental study

Fiore, Annamaria; Levati, M. Vittoria; Morone, Andrea - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

examine the effect of imperfect information on contributions levels. To assess prior risk attitudes, individual valuations of … clear evidence of risk aversion, and of a negative relationship between the latter and willingness to cooperate. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866650

Costly bargaining and renegotiation

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928645

Transaction costs and the robustness of the Coase Theorem

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2000

This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745037

Costly coasian contracts

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 1998

We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ‘contractual solution’ to this hold-up problem is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745370

The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions

Miller, Luis M.; Rauhut, Heiko; Winter, Fabian - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2011

process in which normative conflicts explain the nally emerging norm. The theory is tested with adynamical experiment on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248890

Response Time under Monetary Incentives:the Ultimatum Game

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; León-Mejía, Ana; Miller, Luis M. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

This paper studies the response times of experimental subjects playingthe Ultimatum game in a laboratory setting using monetary incentives.We find that proposals are not significantly correlated with responsetime, whereas responders’ behavior is positively and significantlycorrelated. Hence,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866540

‘The Devil is in the Details’Sex Differences in Simple Bargaining Games

Leon-Mejia, Ana; Miller, Luis M. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

differences. In this paper we test this hypothesis by making maleand female participants to face two different but related … papers: women aresensitive to the design and context of the experiment in ways that menare not. In addition, we go further …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866566

Moral Distance and Moral Motivations in Dictator Games

Aguiar, Fernando; Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Miller, Luis M. - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

We perform an experimenta linvestigation using a dictator game inwhich individuals must make a moral decision —to give or not to give anamount of money to poor people in the Third World. A questionnaire inwhich the subjects are asked about the reasons for their decision showsthat, at least in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866577

Personal Identity in the Dictator Game

Aguiar, Fernando; Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Paz Espinosa, Maria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

function is studied experimentally.The experiment allow us to study the main parametersof the model, suggesting that we should …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866610